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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,1 the Supreme Court put to rest the 
notion that self-described “learned professionals” were exempt from the 
nation’s antitrust laws.  Rejecting the defendant bar association’s claim that 
“competition is inconsistent with the practice of a profession because 
enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to 
provide services necessary to the community,”2 the Court warned that 
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 1.  421 U.S. 773 (1973). 
 2.  Id. at 786. 
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carving out such an exemption would empower professionals “to adopt 
anticompetitive practices with impunity.”3 
Despite Goldfarb’s grave warning against permitting professionals to 
engage in anticompetitive collusion, there remain professionals who—in 
violation of the Sherman Act—painstakingly construct industry rules to 
secure for themselves a captive market that is subject to their exploitation 
and control.  And despite Goldfarb’s sweeping charge to enforce the 
Sherman Act widely, those professionals continue to claim to be exempted 
from antitrust scrutiny.  But instead of invoking a so-called “learned 
professionals exemption” to the Sherman Act, they instead hide behind the 
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.  Worse, these professionals employ 
the First Amendment as a license to suppress the very religious expression 
the Religion Clauses are designed to protect. 
The professionals at issue are America’s rabbis, who currently organize 
cartels that control their placement across the nation.  When a synagogue 
needs to hire a pulpit rabbi, it is confronted with tightly controlled 
professional organizations with strict placement rules.  Those rules require 
both rabbis seeking employment and congregations hoping to hire a pulpit 
rabbi to exclusively use designated placement offices run by the rabbinical 
associations.  These rules—which are enforced through punishments to both 
rabbis and congregations that act independently—prohibit rabbis and 
congregations from communicating directly and seeking preferred matches 
through multiple media.  The rules thus severely limit the supply of rabbis 
available to hiring congregations and prevent both rabbis and congregations 
from enjoying the benefits of an open labor market.  They also meaningfully 
interfere with a congregation’s ability to deliberate fully over whom to 
interview, pursue, and select to be its religious leader of choice.  In short, 
these tight restraints on employment convert the rabbinic organizations into 
professional cartels that simultaneously restrain the operation of a potentially 
competitive labor market and prevent congregations from freely expressing 
their religious practices and beliefs. 
Such economic coercion would normally be a textbook Sherman Act 
violation.  Moreover, subjugation of a religious community from pursuing 
its preferred form of religious practice would be thought to encroach upon 
the essence of what the First Amendment is supposed to protect.  Yet the 
First Amendment can only offer congregations direct protection from state 
action.  This exposes one of the great limitations of the First Amendment: 
although the Free Exercise Clause can prohibit government intrusion on 
religious expression, it does nothing to protect communities from similar 
intrusion or regulation on the part of private parties, including co-
religionists.  The Sherman Act, however, does endow parties injured by 
 
 3.  Id. at 787. 
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anticompetitive conduct with private causes of action and therefore can 
protect these communities from the religious and economic bullying by the 
rabbinic organizations. 
Yet, in an illustration of the First Amendment’s double-edges, the 
Religion Clauses are not only unable to protect congregations from the 
economic coercion of rabbinic bodies, but they have been invoked to 
sanitize that very subjugation.  Because the Religion Clauses protect 
religious groups against certain enforcement actions by the state, any private 
legal action against these rabbinic organizations—even if such an action was 
intended to promote religious expression—also must conform to the First 
Amendment.  Therefore, if the Sherman Act were to protect community 
synagogues and compensate for the shortcomings of the Religion Clauses, it 
must also jump through the hoops set by those same clauses. 
This essay explores this interesting—and important—intersection 
between the Sherman Act and the First Amendment’s religious protections.  
It focuses on the labor market for pulpit rabbis, in which national rabbinic 
associations impose rules upon both their members and hiring congregations 
that deny basic economic freedoms.  These freedoms are normally protected 
by the Sherman Act and, I argue, should be so protected, not only to secure 
for congregations the benefits of market choice, fair competition, and 
protection against economic exploitation, but also to secure their religious 
liberties.  After detailing the rabbinic labor market and placement policies, 
the essay offers a constitutional analysis of alleged First Amendment 
protections, and a normative analysis of how proper application of the 
Sherman Act would liberate both the American rabbinate and American 
Judaism.  The central argument is quite simple: both the Sherman Act and 
the Religion Clauses are intended to protect the populous from entrenched 
power, one against economic concentration and the other against the 
concentration of religious authority.  When entrenched economic power is 
religious in nature, the Sherman Act and First Amendment should act in 
concert, rather than at odds with one another. 
II.  THE RABBI CARTELS 
Most synagogues in the United States belong to one of four movements: 
Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist.  The three non-
Orthodox movements—the focus of this essay—vary significantly in their 
theologies and the practices they encourage their member synagogues to 
adopt, but they are distinct from Orthodox communities (which themselves 
vary widely) in their adoption of egalitarian gender roles and alteration of 
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religious law and practices to conform to post-Enlightenment values.4  Each 
of these non-Orthodox movements rests on three institutional foundations: 
educational seminaries that espouse their distinctive theologies and train 
rabbis, rabbinical associations that serve as governing and representative 
bodies for the movement’s rabbis, and congregational associations that 
establish standards for member synagogues.5 
Each movement’s rabbinical association is a professional association, 
established as a non-profit corporation, that sets the standards for Jewish law 
and practice for its respective movement, serves the professional and 
personal needs of its member rabbis, and fosters institutional linkages 
between the movement’s rabbinate and other central organizations.  The 
Rabbinical Assembly (RA) consists of the Conservative movement’s 1600 
member rabbis worldwide who either have been ordained at the seminaries 
affiliated with the Conservative movement or rabbis ordained elsewhere who 
have accepted the tenets of Conservative Judaism.6  Similarly, the Central 
Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), the professional association of 
Reform rabbis, and the Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association (RRA) for 
Reconstructionist rabbis, consist of rabbis ordained at their own seminaries, 
as well as rabbis ordained elsewhere but who adhere to the movement’s 
central tenets.7  Membership in these rabbinical associations is voluntary, but 
it is essential to rabbis who wish to be employed in synagogues affiliated 
with their individual movements because among the associations’ primary 
responsibilities is their administration of the placement authorities for their 
respective movements.  These placement commissions, organized under the 
close supervision of the rabbinical associations’ leadership, are laden with 
restrictive rules designed to promote and protect the employment of their 
members.  Each of the three non-Orthodox rabbinical associations organize 
placement under similar (and, as will be shown, similarly illegal) rules and 
are thus subject to the same legal analysis.  For the purposes of illustration, 
the Conservative movement’s Rabbinical Assembly will be described in 
detail and will serve as the object of legal analysis. 
The RA considers its administration of the Joint Placement Commission 
as one of its most central responsibilities.8  Charged with the responsibility 
 
 4.  See BERNARD LAZERWITZ ET AL., JEWISH CHOICES: AMERICAN JEWISH 
DENOMINATIONALISM 133–38 (1998) (discussing the origins of and distinctions between the 
denominations). 
 5.   See id. 
 6.  About Us, THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/about-us (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2012) (describing the Rabbinical Assembly as “the international association of 
Conservative rabbis”). 
 7.  See CENT. CONF. OF AM. RABBIS, http://ccarnet.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012); 
RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL ASS’N, http://www.therra.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
 8.  Mission Statement, THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/about-
us/mission-statement (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
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of connecting RA members seeking employment with congregations 
searching to hire a pulpit rabbi, the Joint Placement Commission organizes 
the job market for rabbis seeking employment at Conservative congregations 
and is the only recognized body with the authority to place rabbis in the 
Conservative movement.  Only RA members are entitled to utilize the 
commission’s placement process, and RA members are required to seek 
employment as congregational rabbis exclusively through the RA’s 
commission. 
The Placement Commission makes available its database of RA rabbinic 
candidates only to “congregation[s] in good standing of the Conservative 
movement . . . .”9  A congregation choosing to enlist in the RA’s placement 
process, however, is subject to explicit conditions.  The RA’s placement 
manual for congregations, Aliyah, highlights these restrictions in bullet form: 
 
• A congregation may search for a rabbi only through the offices of 
the Placement Commission.  Eligible candidates are those whose 
resumes are forwarded by the Placement Commission. 
• A congregation served by the Commission shall not advertise in the 
media for a rabbi.  If a congregation advertises, it will be removed 
from the Placement List. 
• If a congregation interviews a non-Rabbinical Assembly rabbi 
without the specific written approval of the Commission, the 
congregation will be removed from the Placement List. 
• If a congregation engages a non-Rabbinical Assembly rabbi without 
the specific written approval of the Commission, the congregation 
will lose placement privileges for at least a year the next time it 
seeks a rabbi.  Other consequences may apply.  Similar rules apply 
to rabbinic candidates as well.10 
 
Consequently, Conservative congregations seeking to find a Conservative 
rabbi are confronted with what amounts to a Hobson’s choice: either the 
 
 9.  RABBI ELLIOT SALO SCHOENBERG, ALIYAH: THE RABBINIC SEARCH AS AN UPLIFTING 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 50 (2008), available at http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/placement/ 
sitedocs/Aliyah-abridged.pdf. 
 10.  Id. at 3–4. 
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congregation seeks rabbinic candidates exclusively through the RA or it is 
foreclosed from RA candidates altogether. 
The RA’s rules pose an even more meaningful threat to its own 
members (hinted at in the lattermost bullet, referencing “similar rules” to 
rabbinic candidates).  RA members who seek employment through 
alternative mechanisms—whether in addition to or instead of the RA 
Placement Commission—will be punished by the Assembly, including being 
excluded from using the RA placement processes for an extended period.  
This applies even for happenstance matches, in which a Conservative 
congregation was introduced to a particular rabbi outside the RA placement 
process and developed a strong desire to employ him/her, and that same 
rabbi has a strong desire to be hired by that congregation.  Both that 
congregation and the rabbi seeking employment must nonetheless go 
through the RA Placement Commission and are prohibited from directly 
discussing possible employment without receiving formal permission from 
the Placement Commission, which in many instances refuses to grant 
permission.  Consequently, the Placement Commission positions itself as an 
unavoidable intermediary in all rabbinical hiring in the Conservative 
movement. 
The RA Placement Commission exploits its position as an intermediary 
to both monitor and restrict individual placements.  Most meaningfully, the 
RA filters the selection of candidates congregations may interview, 
restricting whom a congregation may interview (and hire) and to which 
congregation a rabbinical candidate may apply.  Congregations that contact 
and interview candidates who are not presented by the RA, even if such 
candidates are RA members and seeking employment through the Placement 
Commission, are subject to penalties. 
The RA filters candidates for individual placement according to a stated 
set of rules that give priority to seniority and other RA priorities.  For 
example: (a) congregations with rabbis with the titles of “assistant rabbi” or 
“associate rabbi” are prohibited from promoting those rabbis to a senior 
position without permission from the Placement Commission; (b) 
congregations who have hired an “interim rabbi” to temporarily assume 
pulpit duties may not consider him/her for the permanent rabbinic position, 
even if both the congregation and the interim rabbi desire to continue the 
pulpit relationship; (c) rabbinic candidates need to have a minimum number 
of years of experience before being permitted to apply to mid-size and large 
congregations, and conversely, mid-size and large congregations are only 
permitted to interview candidates with a requisite number of years of 
experience; new members of the RA are considered to have no more than 
two years of seniority, regardless of their actual professional experience, 
thus limiting their application possibilities. 
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Accordingly, irrespective of the desires of different congregations with 
different needs, and irrespective of the individual preferences of particular 
rabbis, RA placement rules restrict the mutual preferences of hiring 
congregations and rabbis seeking employment.  The RA Placement 
Commission substitutes its own values, preferences, and judgment for those 
of the congregation’s leadership and individual rabbis seeking to build their 
own careers. 
III.  RELIGIOUS PROTECTIONS AND THE SHERMAN ACT 
There is little dispute that the RA’s placement rules amount to an illegal 
group boycott.  The Sherman Act unequivocally prohibits competitors from 
colluding to control a market, restrict consumer choice, and exclude 
competitors.  A recent collection of antitrust scholars recently petitioned the 
Supreme Court to recognize that these “restraints by clergy inflict precisely 
the harmful economic consequences that Congress intended to prevent when 
it enacted the Sherman Act.”11  A rudimentary antitrust analysis concludes 
that the Rabbinical Assembly’s hiring restraints are in violation of the 
Sherman Act. 
The observation that the RA’s placement policies are illegal was not 
long ago opined in a guest column in The Jewish Daily Forward.12  In 
response, the RA issued a statement claiming that their policies are 
“consistent with the First Amendment protections afforded to religious 
institutions and therefore not likely to be assailable under anti-trust 
arguments.”13  The First Amendment, however, offers far less protection 
than the RA’s statement suggests.  Perhaps the RA’s motivation behind 
issuing its statement—in addition to providing comfort to its members that 
its policies and centralized authority will remain undisturbed—was chiefly 
to drape a religious cloak over the RA’s highly economic functions, so as to 
characterize an economic boycott as a mobilization of expressive conduct.14  
 
 11.  Amicus Brief of Antitrust Professors and Scholars in Support of Respondents at 11, 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553) 
[hereinafter Amicus Brief of Antitrust Professors]. 
 12.  Barak D. Richman, Rabbi Searches Are Tough, but Are They Illegal?, JEWISH DAILY 
FORWARD (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.forward.com/articles/131723/ (“The inescapable conclusion 
is that the RA’s practices are illegal, and have been for a long time.”). 
 13.  Gilah Dror & Julie Schonfeld, Statement About the Placement System, RA NEWS ALERT 
(Rabbinical Assembly, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2010 (on file with author). 
 14.  Cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (declaring group 
boycotts to be per se illegal if they are motivated by economic purposes and achieve economic 
effects); Costello Publ’g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (subjecting the economic 
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A proper constitutional analysis, however, is largely a power analysis that 
first evaluates whether the Constitution affords Congress the power to enact 
legislation that constrains a religious organization’s conduct and whether 
courts have the power to enforce such legislation against those 
organizations.  The first question regarding legislative power references 
protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause and, relatedly, the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The second question regarding a 
court’s authority to enforce such legislation references protections afforded 
by the Establishment Clause.  This section evaluates the ironic question of 
whether the First Amendment immunizes the Rabbinical Assembly from 
Sherman Act scrutiny, thereby empowering it to restrict the religious 
expression of the nation’s Conservative congregations. 
A.  The Free Exercise Clause, Smith, and the Sherman Act’s Neutrality 
Although the language of the First Amendment’s guarantee that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof” is notoriously terse, the Supreme Court 
has long held that its guarantees of religious freedoms are not absolute.15  
The First Amendment has been interpreted to ensure near-absolute 
protection of religious belief, but its protections of religious conduct are 
“qualified.”16  Thus, religiously motivated conduct “remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society” since “[t]he freedom to act must 
have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection.”17 
The First Amendment does not, for example, restrict Congress from 
passing and enforcing neutral laws of general applicability even if those laws 
burden or even prohibit particular religious practices.18  The seminal 1990 
Supreme Court case Employment Division v. Smith held that “if prohibiting 
the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the 
 
conduct of religious institutions to Sherman Act scrutiny, recognizing that religious expression is 
frequent a part of any such institution’s conduct). 
 15.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“Thus the 
Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute 
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 
(1879). 
 16.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670–71 n.13 (1988). 
 17.  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304; cf. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the 
U.S., Inc., 646 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The possibility that a law of general application 
might indirectly and unintentionally impede an organization’s efforts to communicate its message 
effectively can’t be enough to condemn the law.”). 
 18.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 
131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). 
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First Amendment has not been offended.”19  Therefore, a law is enforceable 
under the Constitution even if it significantly burdens a religious practice so 
long as (1) it is a neutral law of general applicability and (2) it is not 
specifically directed at a particular religious behavior or motivated by a 
desire to interfere with religion.20  Neutral laws that burden religion, without 
any explicit or pretextual intent to target particular religious conduct, do not 
violate the Constitution.21 
The Sherman Act is plainly a neutral and generally applicable law that 
prohibits conduct that Congress is empowered to regulate.22  Moreover, the 
Sherman Act is both neutral and generally applicable insofar as it applies to 
all industries and groups.23  The Sherman Act would therefore pass the first 
prong of the test from Smith. 
Additionally, the Sherman Act was not passed with any Congressional 
intent to target religious groups or religious practice.  Although scholars 
debate Congress’s precise motivations underlying the Sherman Act, none 
have contended that Congress enacted it with a specific goal to burden 
religion.24  If anything, Congress’s focus was on ending the anticompetitive 
behavior of secular entities, such as the trusts that dominated the industrial 
economy at the time.25 
 
 19.  Id. at 878. 
 20.  Id. at 878–79; see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
531 (1993). 
 21.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 880. 
 22.  Id. at 879 (defining a neutral law of general applicability as a “valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the State is free to regulate”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (“Then, in 
response to rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy, 
Congress ‘ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power,’ beginning with the 
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, 24 Stat. 379, and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 
1890 . . . .”). 
 23.  See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) (refusing to find 
an exemption from the Sherman Act for a particular industry on the grounds that given the broad 
sweep of the Sherman Act, such arguments are “foreclose[d]” to the courts and more “properly 
addressed to Congress”). 
 24.  For a sampling of attempts to discern the legislative intent behind the Sherman Act, see 
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 
(1955) (arguing that Congress’s intent was not only to fight trusts, but that they were motivated by 
an egalitarian political rationale aimed at empowering consumers, maximizing consumer surplus, 
and equalizing political participation); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the 
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (arguing that Congress was chiefly concerned with achieving 
economic efficiency and advancing consumer welfare); William L. Letwin, Congress and the 
Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956) (arguing for an interpretation 
that suggests a populist legislative intent from Congress directed at an overall goal of fighting the 
trusts, with flexibility and political compromise as the means for doing so). 
 25.  See generally THORELLI, supra note 24. 
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Accordingly, even if the Sherman Act burdens religious conduct by the 
Rabbinical Assembly or any other religious group, its application is still 
constitutional.  The Free Exercise Clause does not prevent the application of 
the Sherman Act to the rules and practices regarding rabbi searches of the 
Rabbinical Assembly.26 
B.  RFRA and Pre-Smith Protections 
Congress responded to the Smith ruling by enacting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which states: “Government shall 
not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”27  Recognizing that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that 
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion,”28 Congress attempted to overturn the test from 
Smith and instead re-institute the standard in Sherbert v. Verner29 and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 which subjected laws to greater scrutiny.  However, 
RFRA does not curtail application of the Sherman Act to the Rabbinical 
Assembly since the Placement Commission’s restraints are not protected 
even under the pre-Smith understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.  
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court cases limited RFRA to federal law, so 
the RA would remain subject to—and be in violation of—state competition 
laws.31 
1.   Pre-Smith, Commercial Conduct, and Indirect Burdens 
RFRA applies to federal laws, even laws of general applicability, and it 
therefore prohibits the Sherman Act from “substantially burden[ing] a 
person’s exercise of religion” unless its “application of the burden to the 
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”32  Congress passed RFRA explicitly “to restore the compelling 
 
 26.  It should be noted, however, that the protections of the Free Exercise Clause have been 
extended to organizations and institutions (such as the Rabbinical Assembly) in addition to 
individuals.  See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 27.  Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 
(2006)). 
 28.  Id. § 2(a)(4). 
 29.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 30.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 31.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
 32.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006). 
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interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder,”33 and 
the Supreme Court, in its only post-Smith application of RFRA—other than 
clarifying that the central inquiry in RFRA is whether a particular law 
substantially burdens “a person’s” exercise of religion and whether the 
government can satisfy the compelling interest test through application of 
the law “to the person”—relied chiefly on its pre-Smith decisions to guide its 
application of RFRA.34 
Even under this standard, however, the Supreme Court found in the vast 
majority of Free Exercise cases that neutral and generally applicable laws—
like the Sherman Act—either did not substantially burden religion or that 
any burden was justified by a compelling government interest.  
Commentators have observed that after the Court’s upholding of a Free 
Exercise challenge to a generally applicable statute in Yoder, the Supreme 
Court “rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption to come before it” 
for eighteen years.35  These denials of Free Exercise claims include 
challenges to the requirement of social security numbers, military standards, 
and the administration of government programs.36 
In denying these Free Exercise challenges, the pre-Smith Supreme Court 
both scrutinized with a good deal of rigor how substantially a particular law 
burdened religious practice, as well as showed significant deference to a 
state’s claims of a compelling government interest.  In Braunfeld v. 
Brown37—a case that applied the pre-Smith test to facts that relate 
thematically to the Rabbinic Assembly’s restraint—the Supreme Court 
rejected a Free Exercise challenge by observant Jews to Sunday closing 
laws.  The group argued that because Jewish law required them to close their 
 
 33.  Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (internal citations omitted). 
 34.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006). 
 35.  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1990). 
 36.  See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (permitting 
the U.S. Forest Service to harvest timber even if doing so would “virtually destroy” a group’s ability 
to practice its religion); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting a proposed Free Exercise 
exemption from individuals having to provide social security numbers); Goldman v. Weinberger, 
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that an Orthodox Jewish doctor in the Air Force did not have a valid 
Free Exercise exemption from the Air Force’s dress code because of his religious belief in wearing a 
yarmulke); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (“We have never invalidated any 
governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment 
compensation.  Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in context other 
than that, we have always found the test satisfied . . . .”), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 
131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). 
 37.  366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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businesses on Saturdays, the additional obligation to also close on Sunday 
would create too great a burden.38  The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Warren, wrote that to “strike down . . . legislation which imposes only an 
indirect burden on the exercise of religion,” particularly in light of the fact 
that the statute did not prohibit or force any particular religious belief, 
“would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.”39  The 
Court additionally concluded that the government’s interest in having a 
uniform day of rest without assorted exceptions was sufficiently compelling 
to permit the state to establish closing laws that disfavored certain religious 
minorities.40 
The pre-Smith Court expressed a similarly strong hesitation to permit 
Free Exercise challenges to give religious organizations exemptions from tax 
laws and commercial regulations.41  In United States v. Lee, for example, the 
Court rejected a claim from an Amish business owner that the Free Exercise 
Clause exempted him from paying Social Security taxes, ruling that “[w]hen 
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience 
and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are 
binding on others in that activity.”42  Without questioning the central 
importance of governments maintaining “fiscal vitality,”43 the Court 
additionally emphasized the compelling interest to the federal government in 
creating a “comprehensive national program” that had to be “uniformly 
applicable to all.”44  The Court exhibited a similar hesitation in exempting 
religious organizations from commercial laws even when those laws 
impacted specific religious conduct, such as when sale and use taxes are 
applied to sales of religious literature, although it upheld Free Expression 
challenges to taxes that specifically targeted religious conduct or similar 
First Amendment expression.45  The Court recently characterized these cases 
to mean that general laws are upheld when carving out exceptions would 
compromise the underlying purpose of the laws.46 
 
 38.  Id. at 601; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 (1961) (rejecting a similar 
Establishment Clause challenge to Sunday closing laws). 
 39.  Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603, 606. 
 40.  Id. at 608–09. 
 41.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 42.  Id. at 261. 
 43.  Id. at 258. 
 44.  Id. at 261–62. 
 45.  The Court distinguished the imposition of general taxes that burdened religiously motivated 
conduct from specific taxes that targeted a First Amendment activity, such as solicitation.  Compare 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990), with Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). 
 46.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006). 
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Under this case law, the Rabbinic Assembly’s claim that RFRA exempts 
it from the Sherman Act is unlikely to prevail.  First, and most significant, 
the Sherman Act imposes little, if any, burden on “a person’s” exercise of 
religion.  The Sherman Act burdens no member of the Rabbinical Assembly 
from their commitment to observe Jewish laws or serve in their capacity as a 
congregational rabbi.  Even the religious elements of the Rabbinical 
Assembly’s mission itself (if the organization is identified as a “person” 
under the statute) is not compromised by the Sherman Act, which does 
nothing to prevent the professional organization from fulfilling its mission to 
establish religious standards and support its clergy members.  These 
purported burdens on religious exercise pale in comparison to the burdens 
placed on the UDV Church by the Controlled Substances Act, which 
outlawed the sacramental tea church members use to give communion,47 or 
to the Seventh Day Adventist, who was denied unemployment benefits even 
though her religious conviction was the cause of her unemployment.48 
Second, the Sherman Act is intended to be a sweeping statute, without 
exceptions, to advance Congress’s policy of competition.49  The Court has 
rejected claims that certain professions are exempt from the Sherman Act’s 
policy of promoting competition, so tailoring an exemption for RA members 
compromises that congressional policy.  The Court has consistently 
remarked that “Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of 
the Sherman Act,” which “shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
the Act every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or 
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states.”50  Rabbinical 
candidates entering a competitive labor market should be subject to the rules 
of competition that govern other labor markets since, like the Amish 
business owner, the rabbis “enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice.”51  Although one’s personal religious practices are not commercial 
activity, an effort to control the hiring of rabbis to pulpit positions 
nationwide certainly is. 
 
 47.  Id. at 425. 
 48.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 49.  Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (“And our cases have repeatedly 
established that there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions . . . .” (citing United States 
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51 (1963); California v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482, 
485 (1962))); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national 
economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”). 
 50.  Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787–88 (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n., 
322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)). 
 51.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
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In sum, under the standards set out by both the pre-Smith Court’s 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and the modern Court’s 
interpretation of RFRA, enforcing the Sherman Act against the Rabbinical 
Assembly does not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,” 
and RFRA therefore does not curtail the Sherman Act’s scrutiny of the 
Rabbinic Assembly’s placement practices. 
2.   RFRA’s Gaping Hole 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was 
unconstitutional as applied to laws made by state and local governments.52  
The Court held that while Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment 
empowers Congress to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
enforcement power is limited to enacting legislation that “is only preventive 
or remedial” of constitutional violations.53  The Court ruled that Congress 
exceeded its Section V authority in passing RFRA because the statute lacked 
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the 
legitimate end to be achieved.”54 
RFRA therefore does not curtail state law, including the individual 
competition laws that each state has enacted.55  Many of these state 
competition laws “use statutory language that tracks the federal statutes 
closely [and] by either statute or state supreme court declaration, they hold 
that on substantive issues federal case law should be regarded as 
precedential.”56  Although Congress, through RFRA, might have curtailed 
application of federal antitrust laws, it has no authority to limit state antitrust 
laws, which by and large are substantively equivalent.57 
In the wake of the City of Boerne ruling, sixteen states also enacted so-
called “mini-RFRA” laws to reinstate pre-Smith protections of religious 
conduct against their own laws.58  Therefore, just as RFRA could be read as 
 
 52.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 53.  Id. at 508 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 54.  Id. at 530. 
 55.  16 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2401 (2d ed. 2006). 
 56.  Id. ¶ 2410; see also id. ¶ 2401 (“Nearly all states have legislation that emulates the Sherman 
Act, while a somewhat smaller number also have statutes emulating provisions of the Clayton 
Act.”). 
 57.  For example, New York—the state in which the RA is located—has a tradition of 
interpreting its state antitrust act, the Donnelly Act, in conjunction with the Sherman Act.  See 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 538–39 (N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he Donnelly Act—
often called a ‘Little Sherman Act’—should generally be construed in light of Federal precedent and 
given a different interpretation only where State policy, differences in the statutory language or the 
legislative history justify such a result.”). 
 58.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571B (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–.05 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to -
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a limitation of the Sherman Act, mini-RFRAs might similarly limit some 
corresponding state antitrust statutes.  In these sixteen “mini-RFRA states,” 
application of the antitrust laws is subject to pre-Smith protections.  In the 
thirty-four states without mini-RFRA statutes, however, there is no such 
limitation.  Therefore, even if RFRA and mini-RFRAs are broadly 
interpreted to limit applying competition laws to the conduct of religious 
organizations, they still do not limit the application of state antitrust laws in 
these thirty-four states. 
C.  The Establishment Clause, Entanglement, and Intra-Denominational 
Disputes 
Courts are appropriately leery of entering into ecclesiastical disputes.  
When confronted with a legal dispute that requires the dissection and 
interpretation of religious or doctrinal authority, any court intervention or 
ruling amounts to an endorsement of a particular religious position and thus 
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause (it might also transgress the Free 
Exercise Clause, since the ruling infringes on the losing party’s expression).  
Therefore, “[t]he general rule is that courts are prohibited by the First 
Amendment from getting involved in intra-church disputes when doing so 
would require them to become entangled in religious affairs.”59 
The First Amendment does not, however, prohibit courts from 
intervening in intra-denominational disputes altogether.  To the contrary, the 
Supreme Court affirmed courts’ roles in resolving such disputes.  When 
adjudicating a property dispute between competing factions in a local 
Presbyterian congregation, the Court noted, “[t]here can be little doubt about 
the general authority of civil courts to resolve this question.  The State has 
an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property 
disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church 
property can be determined conclusively.”60 
 
404 (West 2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-99 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302–.307 
(West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–258 
(West 2010); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–2407 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-
80.1-1 to -4 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 
(West 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001–.012 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 63l-5-101 to -403 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-I to -2.02 (West 2009). 
 59.  2 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:44 
(2011). 
 60.  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). 
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The First Amendment, however, “severely circumscribes” how civil 
courts can intervene.61  A series of Supreme Court rulings have interpreted 
the First Amendment to require courts to adjudicate such disputes relying 
only on “neutral principles of law” to guide its judicial intervention.62  For 
example, in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, which involved a 
dispute over the rightful occupier of a chaplaincy established by will, the 
Supreme Court prohibited a civil court from determining whether a disputant 
satisfied “qualifications required by the canon law” to serve as a chaplain for 
the Roman Catholic Church.63  However, “the civil courts could adjudicate 
the rights under the will without interpreting or weighing church doctrine, 
but simply by engaging in the narrowest kind of review of a specific church 
decision—i.e., whether that decision resulted from fraud, collusion, or 
arbitrariness.”64  Similarly, the Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church invalidated a state court 
ruling that conditioned a granting of property on a church’s adherence to a 
traditional faith and doctrine and required any court intervention to avoid 
ecclesiastical determinations.65  The Court stated the rule clearly: 
[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil 
courts may play in resolving church property disputes.  It is 
obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property 
claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by 
the First Amendment.  Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of 
religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church 
property.  And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use 
in all property disputes, which can be applied without “establishing” 
churches to which property is awarded.66 
This “neutral principles” approach extends to situations in which rival 
intra-denominational factions dispute over the appointment of clergy.  In 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, for example, the 
Supreme Court refused to prevent the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the 
Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church—which the Court described as 
the “Mother Church”—from defrocking a local bishop even when he and 
local parishioners argued the Mother Church acted arbitrarily and not in 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id.; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969). 
 63.  Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“Because the appointment 
is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential 
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.”). 
 64.  Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 451 (discussing Gonzalez). 
 65.  Id. at 447. 
 66.  Id. at 449. 
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accordance with Church doctrine.67  Recognizing that the Serbian Orthodox 
Church was “a hierarchical church [whereby] the sole power to appoint and 
remove its Bishops rests in the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod,” the Court 
ruled that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts 
shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a 
church of hierarchical polity.”68  To intervene in hiring disputes within a 
hierarchical polity, the Court concluded, necessarily requires doctrinal 
evaluation or review of ecclesiastical authority.69  The Court gave similar 
deference to hierarchical church authority during Cold War challenges to the 
Russian Orthodox Church, when American parishes wanted to assume 
possession of Russian Orthodox property and to appoint their own 
Archbishop.70  Recognizing that “[t]here are occasions when civil courts 
must draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for the 
disposition or use of property,” the Court concluded that civil courts cannot 
trump church rule “when [a] property right follows as an incident from 
decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues.”71 
Importantly, the neutral principles approach does permit intervention in 
some intra-denominational disputes, which is possible when hierarchical 
ecclesiastic relationships do not characterize the relationships among the 
parties.  The Supreme Court, beginning with the seminal case of Watson v. 
Jones72 in 1872, has consistently contrasted hierarchical orders, such as the 
Russian Orthodox Church in Kedroff and the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
Milivojevich, with congregational systems.  In hierarchical orders, as the 
term suggests, the congregation is “a subordinate member of some general 
church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with 
a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some 
supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general 
 
 67.  Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); see also Gonzalez, 280 
U.S. 1. 
 68.  Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 696, 709. 
 69.  Id. at 708–09 (“‘To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power 
within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide . . . religious law [governing church polity] . . . would 
violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.’” 
(quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 
U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
 70.  Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 71.  Id. at 120–21. 
 72.  Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). 
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organization.”73  In contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
authority in congregational orders lies in their self-governance.74  Churches 
(or synagogues) in congregational orders might be affiliated with a religious 
denomination or movement, but they are constituted as independent entities 
and develop and adhere to their own rules of governance and organization.  
For congregational orders, the Establishment Clause prohibits interference 
with congregational decisions, not hierarchical decisions.75 
Thus, when an intra-denominational dispute occurs between Jewish 
factions within a synagogue—a congregational polity—then neutral 
principles permit civil courts to enforce the congregation’s by-laws and 
secure its self-governance.  In Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation 
B’nai Jacob, for example, a synagogue’s majority exercised its authority to 
engineer significant changes in religious practices, forcing members who 
resisted the change to form their own congregation.76  When the synagogue’s 
rival factions continued to dispute the synagogue’s membership criteria, the 
New York Court of Appeals intervened to enforce a stipulation “that arose 
out of a religious disagreement but was resolved in secular terms.”77  Thus, 
neutral principles of law enabled—and compelled—New York’s civil courts 
to resolve lingering disputes over “the ownership of the premises, the area of 
the synagogue that each congregation could use, the payment for use, and 
the percentage that each congregation would receive upon sale or 
demolition.”78  Citing First Presbyterian Church and invoking Avitzur v. 
Avitzur, a decision it issued a decade earlier that enforced a facially neutral 
provision in a religious wedding contract (or Ketubah), the New York Court 
of Appeals concluded that court intervention is permitted so long as “no 
 
 73.  Id. at 722–23; see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110 (“Hierarchical churches may be defined as 
those organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common 
ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.”). 
 74.  Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872) (holding that the appointed 
trustees of the property of a congregational church “cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a 
minority of the church society or meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without 
citation or trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules”). 
 75.  Lower federal and state courts have also recognized this distinction.  See, e.g., Cent. Coast 
Baptist Ass’n v. First Baptist Church, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 119 (Ct. App. 2007) (“If the principle of 
government in a church is that the majority of the congregation is the decision-making body, courts 
must defer to the decisions of that body.  A court may act to ensure that the governing body adheres 
to the acknowledged rules by which it conducts its affairs . . . so long as this undertaking does not 
require the court to inquire into religious doctrine.”).  The line of California Supreme Court cases 
from which this reasoning is drawn originated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Watson, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 723. 
 76.  Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Congregation B’nai Jacob, 686 N.E.2d 1330, 1330–31 (N.Y. 
1997); see also Sillah v. Tanvir, 794 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div. 2005) (enforcing a petition to install 
properly elected trustees of Islamic Falah of America, a religious institution, under the state’s 
religious corporations law). 
 77.  Park Slope Jewish Ctr., 686 N.E.2d at 1332. 
 78.  Id. 
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doctrinal issue need be passed upon, no implementation of a religious duty is 
contemplated, and no interference with religious authority will result.”79 
Accordingly, even though a private action against the Rabbinical 
Assembly under the Sherman Act would amount to an intra-denominational 
dispute, neutral principles of law can readily adjudicate such a claim.  
Whether a plaintiff is a rabbi, to whom the labor market is foreclosed, or a 
congregation, which is denied the benefits of an open labor market, the 
claim would not involve any ecclesiastical determinations, and resolution of 
the dispute does not involve an entanglement with religious questions.  The 
organizational relationships between the relevant parties illustrate the neutral 
principles involved. 
First, like the synagogue at issue in Park Slope, American synagogues 
are independent nonprofit corporations, incorporated under state law and 
governed by a board of directors.  Many synagogues are affiliated with the 
national organizations that lead the different movements, but affiliation is a 
voluntary decision by the congregations and, like other congregational 
polities, the authority to make those affiliation (and other ritualistic) 
decisions lies in congregational self-governance.  Specifically, a synagogue 
affiliated with the Conservative movement might be a dues-paying member 
of United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism (USCJ), an umbrella 
association of Conservative congregations, and thus voluntarily abides by 
USCJ’s Standards for Congregational Practice (which, importantly, 
recommends but does not require adherence to the RA placement policies).80  
But being a member of USCJ does not place the congregation under USCJ’s 
authority.  A Conservative-affiliated synagogue might also, but does not 
have to, hire a rabbi who is a member of the Rabbinical Assembly, but that 
rabbi is an employee of the congregation.  Although the rabbi might be 
obligated to adhere to the Rabbinical Assembly’s code of conduct, the 
congregation is not subject to the RA’s authority whatsoever.  The economic 
and organizational relationships between a Conservative congregation and 
 
 79.  Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. 1983).  Compare id., with Congregation 
Yetev Lev D’Satmar v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (N.Y. 2007), in which a New York civil 
court refused to intervene in an internal dispute in a Jewish congregation over the succession of the 
Grand Satmar Rabbi because part of the dispute depended upon whether a former president was a 
member of the synagogue, and “membership issues such as those that are at the core of this case are 
an ecclesiastical matter.”  See also Kahana, 879 N.E.2d at 1286 (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that neutral principles can determine whether members were elected properly). 
 80.  Standards for Congregational Practice, THE UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF CONSERVATIVE 
JUDAISM, http://uscj2004.aptinet.com/Standards_for_Congre5973.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
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the national Conservative organizations are products of voluntary assent, not 
religious hierarchical authority.81 
And second, the relationships between individual congregations and 
national organizations, such as the Rabbinical Assembly and United 
Synagogue, are governed by contracts that contain neutral terms.  When 
enlisting the Rabbinical Assembly to select a rabbi, for example, its leaders 
agree to a list of concrete procedures (described in Part II) that resemble 
those in a contract binding a homeowner to a real estate agent.  A court can 
readily interpret and enforce this contract without passing upon a doctrinal 
issue, implementing a religious duty, or interfering with religious authority.82  
Importantly, a court can similarly use neutral principles to determine 
whether that restrictive contract complies with the Sherman Act. 
In sum, adjudicating a Sherman Act claim against the Rabbinical 
Assembly does not intervene within a hierarchical polity, does not involve 
an unconstitutional entanglement of religion, and does not require 
interpretation of any ecclesiastical doctrines.  The synagogue is an 
independent congregation that voluntarily engages in contractual relations 
with national organizations.  Those contracts can readily be interpreted—and 
any dispute between the congregation and the national bodies can readily be 
adjudicated—under neutral principles of law. 
D.  The Ministerial Exception 
On January 11, 2012, the United States Supreme Court unanimously 
declared in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC that a “ministerial exception” exempted religious organizations from 
employment discrimination suits from ministerial employees.83  The Court 
reasoned that a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of a religious 
organization to select its ministers “is implicated by a suit alleging 
discrimination in employment.”84  Such an exception was grounded in both 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: 
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its 
own faith and mission through its appointments.  According the 
state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the 
 
 81.  The decentralization of authority is arguably central to the American Jewish experience, and 
perhaps even central to the Jewish Diaspora experience that has characterized Judaism for two 
millennia.  The imposition of external authority upon, or the denial of community autonomy over, 
independent congregations is largely antithetical to Jewish history, theology, and governance. 
 82.  See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138–39. 
 83.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 84.  Id. at 705. 
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faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.85 
The depth of the Court’s ruling, in both rhetoric and votes, introduces 
the possibility that the ministerial exception might bar a Sherman Act suit 
against the Rabbinic Assembly.  Indeed, the question presented to the Court 
characterized the ministerial exception as a bar against “employment-related 
lawsuits brought against religious organizations by employees performing 
religious functions.”86  Such a characterization left open the possibility that 
the exception would bar suits against professional associations of clergy, 
such as the Rabbinical Assembly (which may be properly characterized as a 
“religious organization”87), and that “employment-related lawsuits” could 
include Sherman Act challenges to cartel-like restraints imposed by the 
Rabbinical Assembly and other professional associations of clergy that 
control an employment market through anticompetitive restraints.88  In other 
words, if the ministerial exception applied to all matters of “employment,” it 
might exempt broad categories of legal actions beyond those related to 
employer-employee relations. 
The Court limited its holding to construct a narrow ministerial 
exception, ruling only that the ministerial exception applied to certain suits 
by employees against religious employers.89  The petitioners conceded, in 
fact, that the exception does not apply to suits by third parties, does not 
restrict tort claims, and does not restrict laws involved in the “general 
regulation of the labor pool.”90  Petitioners themselves indicated that the 
ministerial exception only bars claims “that challenge a church’s right to 
hire, fire, evaluate, or make rules for its own ministers.”  Nothing in either 
the Court’s ruling or the parties’ arguments suggest that the exception would 
bar suits by independent congregations against religious organizations with 
which they contract, or by independent clergy who suffer economic harms 
from religious organizations.  To be sure, the Court indicates no intention to 
immunize clergy from the consequences of asserting its economic power to 
injure the economic freedoms of rivals or consumers.  Mistakenly infringing 
 
 85.  Id. at 706. 
 86.  Brief for the Petitioner at i, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553). 
 87.  Amicus Brief of Antitrust Professors, supra note 11, at 1. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit 
brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her.  Today we hold only 
that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.”). 
 90.  Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 20, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553). 
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on economic rights in the name of protecting religious interests crosses 
Judge Posner’s admonition: “The commercial tail must not be allowed to 
wag the ecclesiastical body.”91 
A deeper understanding of the ministerial exception reveals that its 
essence vindicates a congregational polity’s use of the Sherman Act against 
powerful clergy.  The Supreme Court emphasized that the constitutional 
motivation behind the exception is “the interest of religious groups in 
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their 
mission,”92 and the exception is designed to prevent “government 
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and 
mission of the church itself.”93  Because in congregational polities the 
internal decision over which minister, pastor, or rabbi to hire lies in the 
congregation itself, immunizing a professional organization of clergy from 
Sherman Act liability actually is contrary to the motivations underlying the 
ministerial exception.  This spirit underlying the ministerial exception was 
born long before the Supreme Court recognized it earlier this year.  In 
McClure v. Salvation Army, a Fifth Circuit opinion that first articulated a 
constitutional bar on employment discrimination claims against religious 
employers by ministerial employees, the court passionately observed that 
“[t]he relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its 
lifeblood” and “[t]he minister is the chief instrument by which the church 
seeks to fulfill its purpose.  Matters touching this relationship must 
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”94 
Any claim by the Rabbinical Assembly—or their reform or 
reconstructionist counterparts—of being protected by the ministerial 
exception, therefore, is misguided on both legal and theological grounds.  
True, courts are prohibited from regulating a hierarchical religious order, 
like the Catholic Church in Gonzalez and the Serbian and Russian Orthodox 
Churches in Milivojevich and Kedroff, and are appropriately prohibited from 
intervening in matters concerning the appointment and retention of clergy by 
religious employers.  But the ministerial exception is targeted to protect the 
employment relationship between religious organizations and its ministerial 
employees from government regulation.  In congregational orders, where 
authority is invested in the congregation, the protected relationship is 
between the congregation and its clergy, not the clergy’s professional 
relationship with itself.  Moreover, claiming that the exception immunizes 
all conduct related to seeking and obtaining clergy undermines the 
ministerial exception itself.  The exception is founded on a constitutional 
 
 91.  Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 92.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 93.  Id. at 707. 
 94.  McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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commitment to safeguard the religious freedom of individual communities—
the very autonomy and self-determination that many have argued has fueled 
the blossoming of diverse Jewish experiences for two thousand years.  The 
ministerial exception not only does not bar a Sherman Act suit, but its 
motivations might even encourage one. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Rabbinical Assembly’s rules governing its Joint Placement 
Commission are illegal.  Since the Central Conference of American Rabbis 
and the Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association have developed similar 
rules governing the placement of pulpit rabbis, those rabbinic organizations 
are also in violation of the law.  Each placement system imposes severe 
restrictions on the labor market for pulpit rabbis without creating any 
identifiable pro-competitive benefit, and they are outside the protection of 
the First Amendment.  By instituting its placement rules, these rabbinic 
organizations are acting to advance their own commercial interests to the 
detriment of the welfare of consumers, namely the congregations and 
congregants who hire and ultimately benefit from a rabbi’s services. 
There is much that is troubling about claiming that the First Amendment 
protects these organizations from Sherman Act scrutiny.  First, it reflects an 
arrogant rejection of the decentralization that has sustained Jewish 
communities worldwide for nearly two millennia—through global wars, 
holy wars, unfriendly host nations, dramatic technological change, and 
spectacular social change.  And second, it invokes the First Amendment to 
sanitize what is little more than the suppression of religious expression.  The 
First Amendment may not, and ought not, be used to subvert itself.  
Although the First Amendment does not support a claim against the rabbinic 
organizations that stifle religious expression, the Sherman Act does.  At the 
very least, the First Amendment should not prevent a claim that would 
advance its principles. 
Permitting the Sherman Act to fulfill its mandate from Congress to 
promote competition and dislodge entrenched concentrations of power will 
not only liberate congregations from economic restraints.  It will also 
significantly contribute to the vitality of Judaism in America.  Were 
rabbinical organizations to adopt rules that are consistent with the Sherman 
Act—rules that empower individual communities and defer to the 
preferences of both congregants and rabbis—they would kindle the passions 
and empower the dynamism that Jewish communities have shown over time.  
Submitting to the Sherman Act might also transform the national rabbinic 
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organizations themselves, reorienting them away from authoritarian 
placement policies and towards an empowering role in which they help 
rabbis pursue fulfilling careers and abet congregations to hire the rabbi that 
best suits their needs.  Doing so would advance social welfare consistent 
with the dictates of the Sherman Act, advance the First Amendment’s 
principles of free religious expression, and advance the strength and 
robustness of American Judaism. 
 
